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REAL PROPERTY-ADVERSE POSSESSION-TITLE ACQUIRED BY HUSBAND AND

WIFE-John and Maltie Preston moved onto a parcel of land in 1910 where
they lived until 1950 when John died intestate. Maltie died intestate in
1954. Title to the land had been perfected by twenty years adverse
possession. Evidence showed that the adverse possession was intended to
inure to their joint benefi.t.1 Complainants, collateral heirs of John, sued
in ejectment claiming that John took the whole title by exclusive adverse
possession. Defendants, collateral heirs of Maltie, claimed a tenancy by
the entirety had been created, with the survivor, Maltie, becoming the
sole owner. The court of appeals ruled that the husband and wife had
become tenants in common. On writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court,
held, affirmed without opinion.2 Preston v. Smith, (Tenn. 1956) 293 S.W.
(2d) 51.
The principal case is the first to present the problem of the concurrent
estate acquired by joint adverse possession of husband and wife. The
common law knew no such question, £or the husband and wife composed

1 It would seem that when a husband and a wife enter land and possess adversely to
the true owner the prescription would ordinarily run in favor of the husband alone. The
decision in the principal case does not indicate any evidence on which the court based its
ruling that the possession was joint. If it was merely the fact that both husband and wife
were on the land :without color of title, then all disseisin by married couples would lead
to the creation of a concurrent estate.
2 The opinion of the court of appeals was reprinted at the suggestion of the members
of the Supreme Court.
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one legal entity for property purposes.3 Thus adverse possession by a
married couple became the sole possession of the husband. Married
women's separate property acts have abolished this common law unity and
permit the wife to hold property as though she were a single woman.4
These statutes necessarily permit a married woman to become an adverse
possessor. In ruling that a tenancy in common was created in the principal
case, the Tennessee court relied primarily on the rule, stated mainly in
dictum, that tenancy by the entirety must arise from conveyance or devise."
The rationale of this rule is somewhat open to question inasmuch as the
married women's acts, by destroying the marital proprietary unity, seemingly sanction the joint disseisin of husband and wife and the creation
of joint estates. The court's decision is not necessarily incorrect, but it
should be pointed out that plausible arguments may be advanced as well
in favor of either a joint tenancy or a tenancy by the entirety. Littleton
laid down the rule that two or more persons may disseise another to their
joint use and thus become joint tenants.6 This rule has been followed
by several cases, none of which examined the validity of Littleton's
premise.7 Of course, this thread of authority makes no mention of the
possibility of adverse possession raising a tenancy by the entirety because
when the rule was founded the wife could not disseise her husband. Yet,
if Littleton's rule is sound law, the modem rule abolishing the proprietary
unity of marriage would clearly permit spouses to become joint tenants
by adverse possession. From this proposition it is a short step to the creation of an estate by the entirety where local law presumes joint marital
property to be held by the entirety.s It seems that all three concurrent
estates are possible when a husband and wife jointly disseise another.
In view of these possibilities, criteria by which the estate may be characterized is essential. Clearly where the intent of the parties may be ascertained it should control. Absent direct evidence of intent, the estate will
probably be determined by prevailing construction preferences in the
state. A number of states which do not recognize tenancy by the entirety
3 Tyler v. United States, (D.C. Md. 1928) 28 F. (2d) 887; In re Brown, (W.D. Ky. 1932)
60 F. (2d) 269; 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 3d ed., §430 (1939).
42 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §5.56 (1952). The Tennessee Married Women's Act
was passed four years after the statute of limitations had begun to run but the court held
this immaterial.
5 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 3d ed., §430 (1939); Licker v. Gluskin, 265 Mass. 403,
164 N.E. 613 (1929).
6 Lrrr. §278; Co. Lrrr. 181a; 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §6.1 (1952).
7 Putney v. Dresser, 43 Mass. (2 Mete.) 583 (1841); Ward v. Ward, L.R. 6 Ch. App.
789 (1871).
s There is some authority indicating that tenancy by the entirety can arise by prescription. The common law rule that any estate real or personal vesting in husband and wife
created a tenancy by the entirety could be stretched to cover adverse possession. FREEMAN,
COTENANCIES AND PARTITION §63 (1894). It has been held that tenancy by the entirety may
may be created by descent, which involves no instrument. Gillan's Exrs. v. Dixon, 65 Pa.
395 (1870). Although that case involved personalty the court indicated that realty and
personalty would be treated alike. Contra, 2 AMERICAN I.Aw OF PROPERTY §6.6, n. 17 (1952).
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favor tenancy in common over joint tenancy.9 In these jurisdictions
specific intent to create a joint tenancy must be shown to rebut the creation of tenancy in common. It would seem clear that any court bound to
such a rule would find a tenancy in common in the marital disseisin situation, since, by hypothesis, the intent of the parties is uncertain. On the
other hand, jurisdictions which recognize tenancy by the entirety10 often
tend to favor that estate where husband and wife are grantees of a joint
estate.11 This policy would undoubtedly favor an estate by the entirety
where intent is unclear. An opposing policy argument is that the abolition
of the unity of husband and wife has destroyed the foundation of tenancy
by the entirety. Thus no good reason exists for expanding the means of
creating this estate when the theory underlying it no longer exists. Similarly it may be pointed out that Littleton's rule favoring joint tenancy was
developed when that was the favored estate.12 Today, the tenancy in
common is preferred. Certainly the problem presented by the factual
situation of the principal case may be resolved in a number of ways.
Arguably the philosophy of modem law favoring emancipation of married
women's property from the control of the husband would be best served
by the result reached by the Tennessee court. Tenancy in common best
protects the proprietary interests of the wife. Her interest does not depend
on survival and alienability of her interests is more free. Nevertheless the
principal case may be criticized for not considering the numerous possible
answers to a novel and intriguing question of modem property law.

Richard S. Rosenthal
George F. Lynch, S.Ed.

9 2 .AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §6.3, n. 1 (1952); 4 PoWEI.L, REAL PROPERTY §602
(1954).
10 A majority of the states recognize tenancy by the entirety. 2 .AMERICAN LAw OF
PROPERTY §6.6 (1952).
112 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY §6.6, n. 9 (1952); Godman v. Greer, 12 Del. Ch. 397,
105 A. 380 (1918); 161 A.L.R. 457 at 466 (1946).
12 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §6.5 (1952).

